104 STCL, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Spring 1978) a love/hate response on the part of the master, analogous to other often-noted polarities in the works of Thomas Mann. Without wishing to make Thomas Mann into an "existentialist," I would suggest that the interpersonal relations portrayed in the story are illustrative of Sartre's theory of "Being-for-Others" in Being and No- thingness, published nearly half a century later.'
The focus in the story "Tobias Mindernickel" is on the title figure, who is sketched with the selectivity and linearity reminiscent of the Novelle form. The protagonist is a Thomas Mannian outsider, in this case not an artist but simply a loner, who lives in almost total isolation from society. That the reader is given no direct insight into the personality of the character is presumably due to the fact that the narrator, in his ironic first-person stance, has no access to the consciousness of the character he has created (although that character's initials are identical with those of the author). The narrator assumes the role of the external observer who then speculates on the internal processes of consciousness. Frequent occurrence of clauses such as "It seems that ... ," "He appeared as if ... ," "It is possible that ..." puts the actual assertion into a subordinate clause, making it grammatically dependent upon the perceiving consciousness, to whom the events appear as baffling as they do to the reader -and, apparently, also to the protagonist, who seems to be a puzzle to himself. The narrator introduces his topic as follows: "There was a story about this man; I tell it, because it is both puzzling and sinister, to an extraordinary degree" (p. 51).
Since the narrator is ostensibly limited to observational state- He has so thoroughly internalized the opinion of others that it is not dependent upon the presence of an observer: "Further on, when the children had stopped behind and he was not known, and scarcely noted, his manner did not change. He still hurried on, still stooped, as though a thousand mocking eyes were on him" (p. 52). Sartre discusses the state of being-looked-at in the absence of an observer, when "the Other is present everywhere, below me, above me, in the neighboring rooms, and I continue to feel profoundly my being-for-others" (BN, p. 253). This explains why Mindernickel has no perception of the world, of nature or of people, for, as Sartre notes: "We can not perceive the world and at the same time apprehend a look fastened upon us; it must be either one or the other. This is because to apprehend a look is to be conscious of being looked at. The look which the eyes manifest is a pure reference to myself" (BN, pp. 234-35).3
In contrast to this object status, an episode is related in which Tobias acts as a free subject. When a child receives a mild injury at the hands of playmates, Tobias steps in to help. In the first instance of direct discourse in the story, one hears him expressing sympathy and giving something of himself (if only a handkerchief) to another human being, who is in this case an object because of his momentarily helpless states. This assertion of free subjectivity is so gratifying to him that he can now look people in the eye: "His eyes looked larger and brighter, he looked squarely at people and things" (p. 53). However temporary the new self-image may 107 be, one surmises that it gave impetus to his decision to restructure the self-other relations in his life.
One does not know his intentions when, one Sunday morning, he takes a walk along an elegant promenade and there buys a dog. He seems nervous about this "project upon the world" and walks around the dog three times, keeping his eyes fixed on him. After the transaction is completed, Tobias pulls on the line, glancing fearfully about, and amid the laughter of observers he finally gets the dog to his room, from which they scarcely depart. Here begins the description of a subject-object confrontation which is, at its core, sado-masochistic. Significantly, it is an animal that plays the counterpart to Tobias. An adult relationship would, presumably, be too threatening, and even in the case of the child, Tobias was able to act as a subject only as long as the child was injured, i. e. dependent. Not wishing to speculate on the consciousness of animals, one can at least say that they are not selfconscious. 4 As part of the natural world, animals apparently experience no conflict between being and consciousness (which may be the reason they photograph so well). Perhaps even a cat would be too strong a subject for Tobias (as it was for BUchner's Lenz); but a dog's allegiance is unquestionable and the desire to please nearly insatiable, so emotionally dependent is a dog upon his master. 6 To escape the terrible loneliness and anguish of solipsism, Tobias needs another subject that will freely love him, yet one that will not be so free as to withdraw that love. Freedom must be limited to the prescribed realm, for Tobias cannot love that which he cannot control. The dog, as a free natural subject is capable of being converted into a controllable cultural object and is thus an "ideal lover" for Tobias -free, yet dependent. Sartre writes, the lover "wants to be loved by a freedom but demands that this freedom as freedom should no longer be free .... He wants this freedom to be captured by itself" (BN, p. 343). Although the relationship in the story is non-sexual in the physical sense, it has rightfully been said that all existence has a sexual significance and that every sexual phenomenon has an existential significance. Sartre finds three patterns of behavior possible in love: One may lapse into indifference; one may turn to masochism, which is the attempt to become a thing to be controlled by the other; or one may turn to sadism, which entails trying to possess the other by violence. Conflict is thus the inevitable basis of the love relationship.
Just as Tobias was victimized by others, he now makes the dog a victim. His feeling of humiliation gives rise to aggression, and in this inter-animal relationship he asserts all the subjectivity which was denied him in inter-personal relationships. Sartre understands sadism as "a refusal to be incarnated and a flight from all facticity and at the same time an effort to get hold of the Other's facticity" (BN, p. 375). It is not merely the will to dominate or the thirst for power; rather, sadism is born from anxiety in the face of the Other. "What the sadist seeks to appropriate is in actuality the transcendent freedom of the victim. But this freedom remains on principle out of reach" (BN, p. 381). 8 The struggle of two warring subjectivities which began at the moment of contact continues upon arrival at home, as Tobias discovers that with the incentive of food he can control the dog. As the dog becomes tired and does not obey, Tobias reacts by striking him with a stick. Shortly thereafter, however, comes the peripeteia as his emotions change from anger to contempt, to pity, and to love. When the dog licks Tobias' face and boots, it is like a caress, and Tobias virtually loses himself in emotion: "He pressed the dog passionately to his breast, his eyes filling with tears" (p. 55). In this displacement of and substitution for human relations, Tobias gives to and receives from the dog the "love" which was denied him in relations with others. His situation before the Other -be it man or dog -is one of helplessness and sense of inferiority. Sartre writes: "Masochism is a perpetual effort to annihilate the subject's subjectivity by causing it to be assimilated by the Other; this effort is accompanied by the exhausting and delicious consciousness of failure so that finally it is the failure itself which the subject ultimately seeks as his principle goal" (BN, p. 355). 9 The narration of direct discourse when Tobias addresses the dog is reminiscent of his brief encounter with the child, and in both cases the discourse has only emotive, no conceptual content, as the speaker tries to awaken sympathy for his own despair. The "dialogue" is, of course, a monologue, and Tobias personifies the dog in order to have a conversation partner, speaking with him as though he were human. Communication between man and animal is, of course, not unusual; what is exceptional is the totality and the exclusiveness of this mode of relating to the world -and, consequently, the impossibility of relating at all. There is no indication that Tobias spoke with human beings or even with the self. Internal processes seem to be on a preverbal, perhaps pre-reflective level, and language for Tobias is not a live option for self-expression. In the absence of language, the "look" is all the more revealing, for it also "speaks." At a time when he feels dominant it is a "proud and angry look," and for comparison the narrator conjures up the image of Napoleon with the illusion (delusion) of grandeur. His eyes later fill with tears, language breaks down, and with "mild eyes" he speechlessly gazes at the dog (p. 55).
The dominance relations develop with increasing intensity and constant power shifts. Tobias devotes total time and attention to the care of his pet, who is known as "Esau" (which name perhaps contains a reference to the biblical Esau, whose birthright, i.e. right to existence, was appropriated by the other). Tobias, quite understandably, has no desire to appear with the dog in public. The resulting confinement is restrictive for the animal, but it is precisely in this state of "shared isolation" that Tobias can maintain the subject-object dependence which seemingly fulfills his dual desire to give up the self to another and to dominate another. When the dog lies beside Tobias on the sofa and gazes at him with soft, melancholy eyes, Tobias is pleased. When, on the other hand, the dog demonstrates his natural vitality and independence, Tobias becomes insecure; this state produces a psychological feeling of distance and an emotional response of anger. "Then Tobias followed his motions from afar with a helpless, disapproving, wandering look and a hateful, peevish smile" (p. 56). This leads to violence, and on one occasion when the dog escapes out the door, causing Tobias to make a public spectacle of himself, the beating is especially hard. Sartre discusses hate, which "implies a recognition of the Other's freedom.... The occasion which arouses hate is simply an act by the Other which puts me in the state of being subject to his freedom. This act is in itself humiliating; it is humiliating as the concrete revelation of my instrumental objectness in the face of the Other's freedom" (BN, p. 387).
As Esau one day is "accidentally" injured (by running into the knife with which Tobias is cutting the animal's food), the master The intentionality of the act is in this case a difficult question. Although his actions are clearly directional, he seems to be so little aware of his own ambivalent emotions that the results are surprising to him and at once wanted and unwanted. Even on the occasion of the first beating, it was as if some unknown force in a schizoid personality had taken control over what the reader and the protagonist -knew to be "Tobias," and in the final act his movements are termed "mechanical." Repetition of the penultimate scene in the denouement, in which he wounds the dog in exactly the same place, indicates both the intentionality and the blindness of his motivation: when the dog is accidentally injured, he nurses him back to health; but finding the object thus to be escaping him, he injures him again mortally. Perhaps the "ideal" state would be some minimal form of existence in which the dog remained alive but was totally dependent upon the other. Since such a condition of stasis cannot be prolonged in a living organism, Tobias has to kill to make permanent the object position of the Other. Sartre discusses this means of attempting to get hold of the Other's freedom: "If I killed him I would in a way possess him, but since he would no longer be free, this would not satisfy me. He would have escaped me in the end, by dying. On the other hand, if he is still free, then he necessarily escapes me" (BN, p. 380).10
